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STUDENT COMMENTS
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVOLUTION
OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court in three recent labor arbitration cases' had an op-
portunity to exercise its "role of developing a meaningful body of law to
govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments . . . ."2
 The results reached by the Supreme Court in these arbitra-
tion cases were foreshadowed in the famous Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills decision in which Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, inter-
preted Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act4
 as conferring
jurisdiction on federal courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements
and as a mandate to fashion a body of federal substantive common law to
interpret them. One source of this substantive law of collective bargaining
agreements was the Labor Management Relations Act,5 but the choice and
source of common law to supplement it was left open, subject only to the
condition that it conform to the policies of the national labor law.° Justice
Douglas found in Section 301 of the Act? a Congressional policy favoring
and authorizing the specific enforcement of the arbitration provisions of
collective bargaining contracts.° The view was expressed that a collective
bargaining agreement which contained a broad arbitration clause and a
blanket no-strike clause was the ideal method for labor and management
to fulfill their statutory duty to bargain collectively.°
To some it appeared that this decision would flood the federal courts
with litigation and that the development of a body of law to interpret and
enforce collective bargaining contracts would be a slow case by case proc-
ess of assimilating existing contract law and resolving its conflicting inter-
pretations. 1° It also appeared to some that the courts would be placed in
the midst of the day to day problems of labor management relations, tangled
in complexities they are ill equipped to handle, crippled with method of
stare decisis (and its connotations of universality) in situations of infinitely
1 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., supra note 1, at 567.
3 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
4 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185 (1958).
5 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 3, at 457.
6 Ibid.
7 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
8 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 3, at 455.
9 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 3, at 455; United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4 (1960).
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varying complexity and diversity." Court involvement in the resolution of
industrial disputes has the added disadvantage of the delay, in reaching
decisions with finality, inherent in judicial trial and appea1. 12
Justice Douglas, in the Lincoln Mills decision, cut through the com-
plexities of constitutional law to arrive at a simple solution to the question
of federal court jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements;"
and the Justice, by these three recent decisions, has in like manner simplified
the role of the federal courts in interpreting and enforcing arbitration agree-
ments. The function of the courts, as we shall see, has been narrowed almost
to the point of deciding the issues concerning arbitration on the basis of the
pleadings.
1. ARBITRABILITY
(a) The broad clause:
An employee of the American Manufacturing Co. 14 sought reinstate-
ment after he had accepted a settlement of a Workmen's Compensation
claim based upon a permanent partial disability. The seniority clause of
the collective bargaining agreement provided that the employer would em-
ploy and promote on the basis of seniority "where ability and efficiency are
equal.'" 5 The agreement also contained the "standard form" of arbitration
clause (covering all disputes as to the meaning, interpretation, and appli-
cation of this agreement) and a blanket no-strike clause. American denied
reinstatement and after it refused to arbitrate the claim, the union brought
suit under Section 301 to compel arbitration, alleging that American's
refusal to reinstate was contrary to the seniority provision of their agree-
ment.
The employer, American, defended its refusal to arbitrate on three
grounds: 1., the employee was estopped by his acceptance of the workmen's
compensation settlement; 2., he was physically unable to do the work; and
3., this type of dispute was not arbitrable.
The district court found for American on the basis of estoppel; the
circuit court affirmed but for different reasons: "the grievance is a frivolous,
patently baseless one, not subject to arbitration under the collective bar-
gaining agreement.'" It relied on a line of decisions which looked to the
Federal Arbitration Act17 as a "guiding analogyms in determining the rela-
tive roles of the arbitrator and the courts. Under this view the courts should
look to the facts upon which the demand for arbitration is based, not for
11 See, Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 [Lary. L. Rev.
1268, 1285-1300 (1959).
12 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 3, at 463, 464 (dissenting opinion
of Frankfurter, J.).
13 See Wellington, supra note 11, at 1269-74.
14 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
13 Id. at 566.
18 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th
Cir. 1959).
17 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958).
18 Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958).
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the purpose of determining the merits of the controversy but to establish
arbitrability.
"The difference between the two proceedings is in the quan-
tum of proof necessary for the moving party to obtain relief. In
the arbitration hearing, the party seeking relief must fully estab-
lish his claim that the opposing party has violated the contract.
Determination of arbitrability only requires that the moving party
produce evidence which tends to establish his claim."'°
This theory appears to have developed from an analogy to the court's
function in determining its own jurisdiction. 20 Thus, if the subject matter
of a claim is within the arbitrator's jurisdiction, the arbitrator does not lose
his jurisdiction because of the fact that the proper disposition of the claim
may be crystal clear to the court, unless the claim is a frivolous one. The
Supreme Court, in reversing, specifically rejected the limitation on frivo-
lous claims recognizing that " the processing of even frivolous claims may
have therapeutic value . . ."2 ' The Court also rejected the error of the
"Cutler Hammer" doctrine, 22 the preoccupation with ordinary contract law
and failure to recognize the distinct nature of collective bargaining agree-
ments.23 Where the agreement is to arbitrate all grievances upon which the
parties cannot agree, the court's sole function is to determine whether the
claim asserted is "on its face governed by the contract." 24 Here, the union
alleged that it had a grievance concerning the interpretation of the senior-
ity clause and that is sufficient.
In thus restricting the judicial function, the court is requiring the
judiciary to refrain from examining the dispute or grievance sought to be
arbitrated beyond the point of determining that it is allegedly governed by
a provision of the contract. A district court, subsequent to this decision,
has granted summary judgment ordering arbitration, where the grievance
was worded in terms of a violation of a specific provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, notwithstanding the contention that there were still
unresolved questions of fact on the issue of arbitrability. 25 In truth, there
19 Id. at 137.
20 New Bedford Defense Products Div. of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Local 113 UAW, 258 F,211 522, 526 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbi-
tration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 at 1516 (1959).
21 American Manufacturing Co., supra note 14, at 568 (Mr. Justice Whittaker con-
curred in the result on the grounds that the lower court should not look to the merits
of the claim).
22 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
25 American Manufacturing Co., supra note 14, at 566-7: "It [Cutler-Hammer]
held that 'If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be arbitrated
is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be
said to provide for arbitration.' 271 App. Div. at 918, 67 N.Y.S. 2d at 318." See, Hays,
The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term 1959, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 921
(1960).
24 American Manufacturing Co., supra note 14, at 568.
25 UAW v. Waltham Screw Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2196 (D. Mass. Nov. 21, 1960).
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can be no such unresolved questions where the grievance is worded in the
terms of violation of the collective bargaining agreement. All such unresolved
matters can then go only to the merits of the controversy.
Even where the court has so simplified and narrowed the judicial func-
tion, difficult questions can still arise. In Portland Web Pressmen's Union v.
Oregonian Publishing Co.26 the union sought summary judgment ordering
arbitration of a grievance arising out of the company's firing of employees
who refused to cross a picket line of another union. The discharged employ-
ees, all members of the plaintiff union, refused to cross the picket line for a
period of two months, but the firing did not occur until two days before the
collective bargaining agreement between their union and the employer ex-
pired. The arbitration clause covered "all questions . concerning the con-
struction [of] any clause of this contract or alleged violation thereof." 27 The
union did not seek arbitration until after the agreement had expired and
'after it had called a strike. The district court denied summary judgment,
holding that the union's demand for arbitration presented no "justiciable
controversy." The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that since the arbi-
trator could award neither back pay nor reinstatement because of the em-
ployees' continued refusal to cross the picket line, the alleged violation of the
contract was an abstract and hypothetical question. Whether the dischargees
were or were not technically employees during the two day period between
the date of discharge and the expiration of the contract was held to be of
no substantial importance under the agreement. Having found no action-
able contract violation the court declared that .the only dispute was whether
the union had the right to bargain collectively with the company even
though, absent the dischargees, the union did not represent a majority of
the employees in the unit involved. 28 This question was considered to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board."
Contra, Harbinson-Walker Refractories Co. v. United Brick Workers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2077
(Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1960) where enforcement of an award was denied. The agree-
ment provided that either party could submit the grievance to arbitration. The Com-
pany had resisted arbitration and notified the arbitrator that he was without authority.
The court's grounds for denial of enforcement was that the issue of arbitrability had
not been tried by the lower court. It was clear that the union was contending that
the company had violated the seniority provisions of the contract. An important and
interesting side issue was the jurisdiction of the state court to hear the case and apply
federal law. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this question in Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 81 S. Ct. 699 (1961).
20 47 L.R.R.M. 2432 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1960).
- 27 Id. at 2434.
28 The Company had informed the union that it would bargain on a new contract
only when the union could demonstrate that it represented a majority of its employees.
29 This holding, however, is predicated upon the absence of a substantial contract
violation. If this is the case then the union is really complaining of an unfair labor
practice. However the fact that a contract violation is also an unfair labor practice
should not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction. See, United Steelworkers
v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Lodge 12, Intl
Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S 880 (1958) ; Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th
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It is submitted that the court carried its inquiry too far when it looked at
the remedies available to the arbitrator as relevant to the issue of arbitra-
bility.
The controversy in the Oregonian Publishing case in essence is no
different than that of the American case itself, or for that matter of any
case where "the proper disposition of the claim may be crystal clear under
the law."" The proper result or the importance of the grievance are not
determinative of the promise to arbitrate. Properly the court should look
only to whether the grievance is phrased in terms of contract violation or
interpretation.
(b) Exclusions from broad arbitration clauses
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company operates a shop for the normal
maintenance of its barges. It is not equipped to make major repairs and
accordingly it has, from the beginning of its operations more than 19 years
ago, contracted out its major work. In the two year period prior to this
dispute it laid off employees, reducing the bargaining unit from 42 to 23
men. This reduction was due in part to contracting out of normal mainte-
nance work previously done by its employees. A number of employees
signed a grievance charging Warrior with inducing a partial lockout and
thereby violating the contract by arbitrarily and unreasonably contracting
out work. The collective agreement had both a "no-strike" and a "no lock-
out" provision. It also had a grievance procedure which provided for the
arbitration of disputes as to the meaning and application of "the provisions
of this agreement." This provision however excluded from arbitration
"matters which are strictly a function of management." Warrior refused
to arbitrate the grievance and the union brought suit under Section 301.
The district court found that " 'throughout the successive labor agreements
between these parties . . . [the union] has unsuccessfully sought to nego-
tiate changes in the labor contract . . . which would have limited the right
of the [employer] to continue the practice of contracting out such work,' "81
and that therefore contracting out work was always understood as a func-
tion of management and that it was specifically excluded from the arbitra-
tion provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court reversed,
the majority holding that in regard to collective bargaining agreements, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitrationn and in the absence of
an express provision excluding the particular grievance from the arbitration
machinery, arbitration should be ordered." The phrase "matters which are
strictly a function of management" is broad and vague. To determine its
Cir. 1951); United Elec. Workers v. Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956)
(dictum); Note: Jurisdiction of Arbitrators and State Courts over Conduct Constituting
Both a Contract Violation and an Unfair Labor Practice, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1956).
3° New Bedford Defense Products Div. of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local
113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522, 526 (1st Cir. 1958).
31 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 588.
32 Id. at 583.
83 Id. at 585.
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contents is to examine the merits of the grievance or construe the contract;
and it is the arbitrator's decision on these questions that the parties bar-
gained for, not that of the courts. 34
The Court reasoned that collective bargaining agreements are so differ-
ent in their nature and purposes from conventional commercial arbitration
contracts that the precedents for interpreting the latter are not applicable
to the former.35 The policy of the Labor Management Relations Act is to
enforce agreements to arbitrate in order to stabilize collective bargaining.3"
The agreement to arbitrate grievances arising under the contract and matters
not settled by the contract is the "quid pro quo" for an agreement not to
strike.37 The court must avoid any consideration of the merits of the con-
troversy even through the medium of interpreting the arbitration clause in
the contract; this precludes an examination of the bargaining history in
construing the clause." To hold otherwise would be to substitute the judg-
ment of the courts for that of the arbitrator, and it is the judgment and
"expertise" of the arbitrator that the parties have bargained for." For this
reason the courts cannot infer or imply an exclusion from the arbitration
clause; it must be express; to infer an exclusion is to construe the sub-
stantive provisions of the contract. 4°
The dissent applied the traditional judicial approach to arbitration
contracts: those matters which are not expressly included in the jurisdiction
of the arbitrator may not be included by implication. Arbitration divests
the courts of jurisdiction and is founded upon the agreement of the parties
which may never be implied as it is in derogation of the rights of the
parties to have a court determination of the controversy 4 1 The dissent
examined the prior history of collective bargaining not with a view to deter-
mining the merits of the agreement but rather to determine the "jurisdic-
tion" of the arbitrator. 42 Viewed in this light, the dissent was of the opinion
that the union was attempting to obtain under the guise of arbitration that
which it could not obtain in collective bargaining. 43
In considering this case, however, it should be kept in mind that the
court was faced with a very broad arbitration clause and a vague exclu-
sionary clause. This caveat is expressed by the concurring opinion:
"The very ambiguity of the Warrior exclusion clause suggests
that the parties were generally more concerned with having an
arbitrator render decisions as to the meaning of the contract than
they were in restricting the arbitrator's jurisdiction. The case
34 Id. at 584-5 (by implication).
35 Id. at 578.
30 Ibid.
37 Id. at 578 n.4; Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 3, at 455.
38 Warrior & Gulf Navigation, supra note 31, at 585.
39 Id. (by implication).
40 Id. at 581-2.
41 Id. at 585-92 (dissenting opinion of Whittaker, J.).
42 Id. at 592.
43 Id. at 588 (by implication).
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might of course be otherwise were the arbitration clause very
narrow, or the exclusion clause quite specific, for the inference
might then be permissible that the parties had manifested a greater
interest in confining the arbitrator; the presumption of arbitra-
bility would then not have the same force and the Court would
be somewhat freer to examine into the merits."'"
In addition to the determination of subject matter arbitrability is the
question of the necessity for procedural compliance. Does the agreement
make its procedural steps conditions precedent to suit on the contract?
To state the proposition is to suggest its answer. The problem here is one
of construction of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the agree-
ment and for this reason the compulsion of the American and Warrior cases
as precedent has been doubted." However, the courts which have been
faced with the question subsequent to the Supreme Court Cases have held
these decisions as governing and the question one for the arbitrator." This
result seems desirable. The procedural provisions can and often are as
vague as the exclusionary clauses. If the arbitrator is in a superior position
to determine the meaning of an exclusionary clause, because of his "knowl-
edge of the common law of the shop"" and the effect of his judgments on
"morale" and "tensions," 48 his position is certainly just as superior for the
determination of procedural compliance.
2. ARBITRATION AWARDS
The Enterprise Wheel case" raised the problem of the standards to be
applied by a court in reviewing the arbitrator's award, the court being
limited to the determination of whether the arbitrator "exceeded his juris-
diction" in making the award. The award involved workers who were wrong-
fully discharged during the term of the contract. The contract had expired
and the employer's operations continued without a new, contract. The
arbitrator ordered re-instatement after the expiration of the contract with
back pay to the date of re-instatement. All the members of the court
agreed as to the propriety of the award of back-pay during the term of
the contract. 6° The dissent however, was of the opinion that the arbitrator
exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering re-instatement after the expiration of
the contract and in ordering back pay for the period after the contract's ex-
44 Id. at 572-3 (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
45 See, Note 70 Yale L.J. 611 (1961) where it is suggested that the considerations
which require the function of the courts to be restricted in determining subject matter
arbitrability (danger of interpreting the merits, embryonic nature of collective bar-
gaining agreements, etc.) do not apply to the question of procedural compliance.
45 Philadelphia Dress Union v. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa.
1960) ; Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp,, 46
L.R.R.M. 3084 (3d Cir. Oct. 7, 1960).
47 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
48
 Ibid.
44 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
50 Id. at 600 (dissenting opinion of Whittaker, J.).
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piration arguing that whatever rights the employees might have had under the
contract, the employer was free to fire them at will after its expiration."
The majority was of the opinion that for it to review the arbitrator's
application of the principles of law relevant to the interpretation of labor
agreements would completely emasculate the "arbitrator's decision is final"
provision of the agreement and would in effect engage the courts in the con-
struction of the contract.52
The arbitrator, although confined to interpreting and applying the
collective bargaining agreement, may look to many sources for guidance in
making an award. The customs and practices of the industry and the law
developed from the national labor legislation are relevant to his inquiry; 53
the mere fact that the award resembles remedies developed under the Labor
Management Relations Act does not mean that the arbitrator was not inter-
preting and applying the collective bargaining agreement. Mere ambiguity
as to the basis of the award is not a sufficient reason to deny enforcement."
"It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for;
and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of
the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his." 55
But quite obviously at some point the courts must interfere. The
opinion does not indicate with any specificity at what point this
will be, beyond indicating that judicial activity will be minimal. The
opinion does not indicate that where by his own words the arbitrator
expressly states that he is not interpreting or applying provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement the courts should refuse enforcement."
It also states that where it is apparent that the arbitrator exceeded his sub-
mission or abused his trust the courts should likewise intervene. However,
this statement must be evaluated in the light of the facts of the case before
the court, for certainly in the eyes of the dissenter it was apparent that the
arbitrator had exceeded the submission." The opinion can probably best
be understood when examined in the light of the collective bargaining proc-
ess. If the parties have chosen to employ arbitration, then the arbitrator
becomes an indispensable part of the collective bargaining process." The
arbitration process being primarily a system of private law, short of
assuring good faith and due process, the courts should probably not inter-
fere."
Such vague limitations can be expected to produce varying results and
51 Id. at 601-2 (dissenting opinion of Whittaker, J.).
92 Id. at 598-9.
53 Id. at 597.
54 Id. at 598.
55 Id. at 599.
50 Id. at 597.
" Id. at 599-602 (dissenting opinion of Whittaker, J.) (by implication).
58 Id. at 596.
59 Cf., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
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considerable litigation. Illustrative of this is a Sixth Circuit opinion decided
subsequent to the Enterprise case." In the arbitration proceeding the union
claimed that the employer had violated their agreement by speeding up the
assembly line on one of the articles used in the finished product. The arbi-
trator found that the union had failed to carry the burden of proving the
"unreasonableness" of the quota and dismissed the grievance. However, he
directed the parties to enter into negotiations with a view towards de-
termining, through engineering surveys, a proper rate. During the nego-
tiations the old rate was to be maintained. The collective bargaining
agreement provided as follows:
"The function of the arbitrator shall be of a judicial rather
than a legislative nature. He shall not have the power to add to,
ignore, or modify any of the terms and conditions of the contract.
His decision shall not go beyond what is necessary for the inter-
pretation and application of this contract. . . "61
The employer refused to comply with so much of the award as dealt
with negotiations concerning the engineering surveys. The union brought
suit under Section 301 for enforcement. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority." On rehearine the court distinguished the Enter-
prise case. It held that the arbitrator's power was strictly limited by the
"judicial function" clause and that once the arbitrator had decided that
the grievance was without merit his authority was exhausted.
The Court in the Enterprise case was not faced with the problem of
construing a clause limiting the arbitrator's jurisdiction, but the three cases
considered together do indicate the probable approach. If the court refuses
to construe exclusionary clauses governing arbitrability for fear of influ-
encing a decision on the merits then it does not appear that it will be any
more willing to construe clauses limiting the remedial power of the arbitra-
tor. A clause stating that the arbitrator's function is judicial is not unam-
biguous; e.g., does "judicial functions" encompass merely the limited power
of a court of law or the broad remedial powers of a court of equity? For
the judiciary to decide whether a particular arbitrator in a particular in-
stance acted in a non-judicial manner would appear to involve a greater
danger of deciding the merits of a controversy than would a consideration
of bargaining history in order to determine whether a particular activity is
a "management prerogative." The latter, of course, the court has refused
to do.
If the "judicial functions" clause is not specific enough to be applied
by the courts, but is to be construed only by the arbitrator, then the award
136 Local 791, WE v. Magnavox Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2296 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1960).
01 Id. at 2297.
62 Ibid.
63 Local 791, ICE v. Magnavox Co. 47 L.R.R.M. 2571 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1961).
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must be enforced unless it is "apparent that the arbitrator went beyond
his submission"" or in his own words manifested an infidelity to his obli-
gation and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. It would
appear that the arbitrator's opinion in this case contains the same type of
ambiguity present in Enterprise. His holding that the union had failed to
meet its burden of proof and his ordering of the surveys are, to a degree,
at least inconsistent. The ordering of the surveys might be considered a
device for adducing further evidence before reaching a final result on the
merits; in this state of doubt the court should not interfere.
3. CONCLUSION
Some may object that the majority of the Court has exceeded the bounds
of judicial self restraint and read its approval of arbitration as a means of
settling labor disputes into the Labor Management Relations Act." Section
301 of the Act was, in the view of some, merely designed to give unions and
employers a federal forum for enforcing rights arising under state substan-
tive law in those states which did not allow suits by or against unincorpo-
rated associations.°6
 In the words of Senator Taft, ". . All we provide in
the amendment is that voluntary associations shall in effect be suable as if
they were corporations, and suable in the Federal courts if the contract
involves interstate commerce . . . 2' 67
Breach of contract was not made an unfair labor practice in and of
itself," and the National Labor Relations Board has traditionally rejected
the role of policing collective bargaining contracts. 69
 The clause in Sec-
tion 203, upon which Justice Douglas bases his contention that the Congress
intended to indorse the policy of enforcing arbitration contracts, is on its
face merely a limitation on the authority of the Mediation Service.
"203(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to make
its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of
such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional
cases."" (Emphasis supplied.)
However, the statutory language was not explicit and it lends itself to the
construction adopted by the Supreme Court in the Lincoln Mills case. Further,
the Act has been amended since the Lincoln Mills decision, so that Congress
64 Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 49, at 598.
65
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 589 (dis-
senting opinion of Whittaker, J.).
66
 See, Wollett and Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement,
7 Stan. L. Rev. 445 (1955).
67 92 Cong. Rec. 5705 (1947).
65
 See, Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
69 Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).




must be deemed to have impliedly accepted the Court's construction of
the Act.71
The declaration of policy contained in the Labor Management Relations
Act states that one of its purposes is "to promote the full flow of com-
merce"72
 and the rationale upon which the Court upheld its constitutionality
was that Congress was exercising the Commerce power in order to remove
obstructions to the flow of commerce such as those caused by strikes. 73
The series of decisions under discussion may foreshadow the develop-
ment of a means for obtaining the objective upon which the constitutionality
of the Act was based. Thus, after twenty five years, the combination in a
collective bargaining agreement of a blanket no-strike clause and a broad
arbitration clause may provide a voluntary means of avoiding the work
stoppages and the public injury which result from the inevitable frictions
of an industrial society. The optimism expressed is dampened by several
possibilities, one of which is that the effect of the decisions may be, at
least in some instances, merely an incentive for more carefully drafted
exclusionary clauses or express limitations upon the remedies an arbitrator
may award.74 Some may abandon arbitration provisions entirely. The
other and more serious possibility, is that the Court will not give equal
effect to the obligations of both of the parties to the arbitration contract."
71 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin),
73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-531 (1960 Supp.).
72 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141(b) (1958).
72 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ; American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 387 (1950).
74 Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term 1959, 60 Colum. L.
Rev. 901, 925 (1960). Cf., Note 70 Yale L.J. 611, 620-22 (1961).
75 See generally, Labor Injunctions and Judge Made Labor Law: The Contemporary
Role of Norris-Laguardia, 70 Yale L.J. 70, 94-100 (1961).
A circuit court has denied specific enforcement of a no-strike clause, holding that
despite Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, that restrictions imposed
on the court's jurisdiction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act were still applicable [A. H.
Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957)1. The
court noted that where the drafters of Taft-Hartley wished to make the provisions
of the Norris Act inapplicable, they did so expressly and for this reason the court would
not imply a partial repeal of the latter statute. The court gave effect to Section 301
to the extent of allowing damages for breach of contract.
Another circuit in a recent decision has enjoined a strike in violation of an arbi-
tration clause [Chauffers Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345
(10th Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 29 U.S.L. Week 3203 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1961)3. The
results reached by the two cases may be reconciled, although the court in the latter
decision did not attempt to do so (at 349), because the issues presented by the two
cases are quite different. The employer is under a statutory duty to bargain con-
tinuously during the Iife of the contract in regard to those matters which were left un-
resolved by the contract or were not contemplated at the time of its execution [The
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1952) ; Cf. Local 9735, United Mine Workers v. N.L.R.B., 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958)1.
The exercise of organized economic power may be vital to obtain the employer's prompt
compliance with his duty to bargain collectively [Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents
Union, 361 U.S. 488, 495 (1960)] and it was the purpose of the Norris Act to protect
this power [Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S.
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Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, expressed the view that a
collective bargaining agreement which contained a broad arbitration clause
and a blanket no-strike clause was the ideal method for labor and manage-
ment to fulfill their statutory duty to bargain collectively." The concurring
opinion stated that the presence of a no-strike clause was not necessary to
the result reached, 77 and if this is an accurate expression of the opinion of
the majority, of what significance is Justice Douglas' emphasis upon the
fact that arbitration is the "quid pro quo" for a no-strike clause?
It would seem to point in the direction of carrying the Court's policy
to its logical conclusion: that is, if the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
prohibit an injunction ordering an employer to arbitrate or enforcing an
arbitrator's award, then it should follow that a strike in regard to a matter
subject to arbitration should be enjoined and the union ordered to proceed
to arbitration, and a strike aimed at nullifying an award unfavorable to the
30, 40-41 (1957)j. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act has the effect of subjecting the
union to liability for damages when it violates a no-strike clause, but the Norris Act pro-
tects the union from an injunction in doing so [A. H. Bull Steamship Co. supra; Cf.
Labor Management Relations Act § 13, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958),
N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1960)1. Thus the union is free to weigh
the alternatives and exercise a choice.
The case of a contract with a, no-strike clause and no provision for arbitration
must be contrasted with a contract in which the union has relinquished its right to
strike in return for arbitration: the latter contract makes provision for the continuous
obligation to bargain. A literal reading of the Norris Act would bar a federal court
from specifically enforcing a no-strike .clause coupled with provisions for arbitration
[Chauffers Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, supra, at 350; See, Note, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 354 (1958)1; however, an examination of the legislative history of
the Norris Act and the purposes it was designed to achieve would point to an opposite
result. The Norris Act was aimed at restricting the federal equity power in order to curb
the injunctive abuses then prevalent (Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind, R.R. Co., supra) and with these exceptions the federal courts retain their common
law equity jurisdiction [United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 270 (1946)]. There
is evidence from the legislative history that Congress contemplated that the Norris Act
would not be applicable to situations where the parties have channeled their obligation to
bargain (Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., supra).
Surety it cannot be argued that the union must retain the economic power of the strike
in order to coerce the arbitrator. The provision in the collective bargaining agreement
that the arbitrator's decision is final would be rendered meaningless if a strike aimed at
nullifying the award could not be enjoined [Cf. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)].
By arbitration the union has obtained a means of resolving disputes without
resort to the use of economic weapons (Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago
River & Ind. R.R. Co., supra); the union should not be permitted to disrupt the channels
of collective bargaining which it has voluntarily chosen. Further, the court can grant an
injunction operating on both parties, ordering arbitration and thus insuring the employ-
ment of the channel the parties have chosen [Cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960)].
76
 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4 (1960).
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union should also be enjoined." Thus the policy would have full symmetry
being equally binding on both parties. It was this latter aspect which worried
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the Lincoln Mills case" and whether the
majority is willing to accept the full implications of the doctrine remains
to be seen.
78 See supra note 75.
79 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 462-63 (1957)
(dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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